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Airline Industry in Tailspin
Contributed by a labor activist with experience in airline
industry
A wave of layoffs and concessions is sweeping the airline industry. Starting
with U.S. Airways last fall, airline management began using the bankruptcy
courts to blackmail unions into agreeing to massive wage cuts and sweeping
work rule changes. The end result of this process, if it is not halted,
will be a transfer of billions of dollars from airline workers to the
owners of the industry.
The airline industry is one of the most heavily unionized industries
in the U.S. Pilots at all of the major carriers and the vast majority
of the smaller carriers are organized. Flight attendants are organized
at all the major airlines, except at Delta and most of the regional and
smaller national airlines. In contrast, the rate of unionization for all
private sector workers is just over 8%.
Just a few years ago, airline unions were on the move, fighting to gain
ground lost in the 1990’s. Pilots and mechanics were finally racking up
wage increases in the double-digit range. Then, a combination of the prolonged
recession - when business travel drops and people have less money for
vacations - and the downturn in passenger flying following the airplane
hijackings in September 2001 shook the industry. According to the Association
of Flight Attendants, “the real problem is that $20 billion less in revenue
is coming into the United States airline industry today than in 2000.”
The Drive for Concessions
The airlines are taking advantage of this crisis in the industry to try
to beat down the unions, which rank among the most powerful unions in
the country. The companies have been chomping at the bit to do this for
years, frequently proposing legislation to take away the right to strike
for airline workers.
Pilots at major airlines such as United Airlines and U.S. Airways have
already agreed to pay cuts of 30% or more. Flight attendants, mechanics
and other airline workers have taken large concessions at U.S. Airways
and United. Other airlines have jumped on the bandwagon as well. Management
at Northwest Airlines, American Airlines, Midwest Express and many other
airlines are lining up at the trough and demanding concessions from workers.
The unions are faced with bosses who say, “Agree with these concessions
or we will go into bankruptcy court and ask that the union contract be
thrown out.” And, for the most part, the unions have been going along
with the demands. The airline management is acting like management everywhere
- the more workers give them, the more that they want. Without a strategy
to halt the givebacks, there appears to be no end in sight.
At U.S. Airways, the pilots’ unions had granted management $646 million
in concessions per year before the company filed for bankruptcy. Even
those massive concessions where not enough for management. As soon as
they had them in their pocket, they headed to bankruptcy court to seek
to terminate the pilots’ pension plan. That would mean cuts of up to fifty
percent in pension benefits that the pilots had already earned.
At United Airlines, the union heads sold concessions to workers by saying
it was better to negotiate the cuts than have the bankruptcy court make
the cuts. Flight attendants at United agreed to 9% pay cuts before United
went into bankruptcy. Now that they are in bankruptcy, United management
keeps turning the screws on the workers. They are seeking more concessions
and are seeking to spin off 30% of the domestic flying to a low-wage subsidiary.
The end result of these concessions is another massive transfer of wealth.
Roots of the Problem
One root of the problem is a system of labor bargaining that ties workers’
fates to the fate of an individual company and the unions’ failure to
prevent the development of a two-tier wage system in the industry.
As with other industries in the United States, unions are forced to bargain
with an individual company, rather than by industry. That bargaining system
ties the workers’ fate to the success or failure of an individual company.
It also prevents a class-wide solution to a problem and allows the companies
to pick off workers one by one. So, even in relatively democratic unions
such as the pilots and flight attendants, workers will vote for concessions
rather than see the company go under. If the company goes under and a
pilot or flight attendant has to start at a new carrier, they go to the
bottom of the seniority list and pay scale. This puts tremendous pressure
on even strong unions to agree to concessions.
A related problem has been the development of a two-tier wage system
in the industry. In other industries, such as trucking, unionized companies
spun off non-union subsidiaries in a process known as double breasting.
Then they paid the non-union drivers far less and spun more and more of
the work to them.
The airline industry has seen a similar development. Thus, the unionized
American Airlines created American Eagle, where flight crews receive lower
wages and have looser work rules, even though they are unionized as well.
There has also been the development of lower wage regional and national
airlines. These are both union, such as Southwest and ATA, and non-union
such as Jet Blue. These lower wage competitors are helping to drive the
majors into bankruptcy.
Rather than fight against the development of a two-tier wage system,
union heads went along with it, negotiating lower wages at the smaller
airlines. Beginning in the 1980’s, pilot unions began tying in the wages
of pilots to the size of the aircraft. With bigger and bigger planes,
that meant pilot wages for the biggest equipment at the major could go
well over $200,000 per year, plus multiple pension plans. At the same
time, pilots and flight attendants at the regional airlines could be making
$15,000 per year. With such a disparity of labor costs, the high wage
airlines over the long run were bound to run into trouble.
Short-term Fight-back and Long-term Strategy Needed
Faced with an employer onslaught towards concessions, an anti-concessions
movement is desperately needed in the airline industry. Such a movement
would argue against all concessions and advocate class-wide approaches
to the attacks. While workers and unions at certain airlines may still
agree to concessions, the companies would only get them after a fight.
And at many airlines where management is jumping on the concession bandwagon,
the take backs can be defeated.
In the longer term, the airline unions, as well as unions in every sector,
must develop a strategy to break out of the rigid rules bargaining courts
and politicians have straightjacketed unions with. Otherwise, weak unions,
fighting company by company, will continue to face permanent replacements,
threats of bankruptcy and relocations, and the resulting weak contracts.
To do so will take intense class struggle and engaging in activities ruled
illegal by the courts, with a goal of establishing solid industry-wide
agreements. The current state of class conciousness in the industry and
among the leadership of the unions is such that this approach will not
be adopted in the short run. However, once a broad section of the advanced
workers and progressive staff in the industry are won over to the necessity
of a strategy, the battle will be half won.
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